This dissertation comprises three essays revisiting the classical topic of quality provision in a duopoly. Two essays consider a situation in which consumers cannot identify the origin of an individual product but observe or infer the average quality of the units brought to the market: Chapter 2 studies the case where the two producers bargain over a minimum quality standard before deciding about their own quality level, while Chapter 3 deals with the case where qualities are (exogenously) fixed and producers have to decide about the quantity they will offer for sale. The final essay (Chapter 4) switches to a perfect-information environment and asks whether the producer of an inferior variety is able to deter the entry of a superior product by having retailers sign onto exclusivity contracts.
Contents
CHAPTE
1 INTRODUCTION AND SUIVIl\IIAR
2 PRODUCERS BARGAINING OVER A QUALITY STANDAR
2.1 INTRODUCTIO
2.2 MODE
2.3 PRELIl\lINARIE
2.4 ANALYSI
2.5 EXTENSION
2.6 CONCLUSIO
2.7 ApPENDI
3.3 STANDARD COURNOT DUOPOL
3 THE MARKET FOR l\lELONS: COURNOT COl\lIPETITION WITH UNOB-SERVABLE QUALITIES
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.5
INTRODUCTION
MODEL
UNOBSERVABLE DIFFERENCES IN QUALITY A TAXONOMY OF EQUILIBRIUM
3.6 WELFARE CONSIDERATIONS
3.7 CONCLUSION
4 EXCLUSIVE QUALITY .
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 MODEL
4.3 LINEAR PRICING
4.4 TWO-PART TARIFFS.
4.5 CONCLUSION .
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Author: Argenton, Cedric
Source: Stockholm School of Economics
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