Title: The Bank Regulation in Argentina: – a Comparative Study of 1990 and 2003
Background: The Argentine bank sector suffered from inefficiency and high operative costs throughout the 1990s, as well as a low confidence mainly due to uncertainty about future government policies caused by inconsistent government policies. The Argentine bank regulation underwent several changes between 1990 and 2003 to improve the performance within the market and increase the overall confidence for the Argentine bank system. The Central Bank was given a new role and made independent, capital requirements were introduced and the Supervision of the bank sector was changed.
Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to make a comparative study of the bank regulation in 1990 and the bank regulation in 2003 in Argentina, in order to analyse how the bank regulation has affected the performance of the bank market…
Contents
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROBLEM DISCUSSION1
1.2 PURPOSE
1.3 LIMITATIONS
2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE METHOD
2.2 COLLECTION OF DATA AND CHOICE OF THEORETICAL APPROACH
2.3 CRITICISM OF THE METHOD AND THE USE OF SOURCES
3 FRAME OF REFERENCE
3.1 THE STRUCTURE-CONDUCT-PERFORMANCE MODEL
3.2 APPLICATION OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACH
3.2.1 BASIC CONDITIONS
3.2.2 MARKET STRUCTURE
3.2.3 PERFORMANCE
3.2.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY
4 BANK REGULATION IN ARGENTINA
4.1 SUMMARY OF THE BANK REGULATION IN 1990 AND 2003
4.2 BANK REGULATION IN 1990
4.2.1 THE ROLE OF THE BCRA
4.2.2 PROTECTIVE REGULATION
4.2.3 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
4.2.4 COMPETITION POLICY
4.2.5 BANK SUPERVISION
4.3 BANK REGULATION IN 2003
4.3.1 THE ROLE OF THE BCRA
4.3.2 PROTECTIVE REGULATION
4.3.3 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
4.3.4 COMPETITION POLICY
4.3.5 BANK SUPERVISION
5 THE BANK MARKET IN ARGENTINA
5.1 BASIC CONDITIONS OF THE BANK SECTOR
5.1.1 SUPPLY AND DEMAND
5.1.2 UNCERTAINTY CAUSED BY MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
5.1.3 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND UNCERTAINTY
5.2 MARKET STRUCTURE
5.2.1 MARKET CONCENTRATION
5.2.2 ENTRY BARRIERS AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE
5.2.3 OWNERSHIP
5.3 PERFORMANCE
5.3.1 RETURNS
5.3.2 SERVICE QUALITY
5.3.3 MARKET POWER
6 ANALYSIS
6.1 RETURNS
6.1.1 PROTECTIVE REGULATION
6.1.2 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
6.1.3 COMPETITION POLICY
6.1.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY
6.2 SERVICE QUALITY
6.2.1 PROTECTIVE REGULATION
6.2.2 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
6.2.3 COMPETITION POLICY
6.2.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY
6.3 MARKET POWER
6.3.1 PROTECTIVE REGULATION
6.3.2 PRUDENTIAL REGULATION
6.3.3 COMPETITION POLICY
6.3.4 GOVERNMENT POLICY
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS
7 REFERENCES
8 APPENDIX
Author: Sörensson, Emma
Source: Linköping University
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